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This paper provides new evidence on the formation and anchoring of inflation 
expectations. I conduct a game experiment and analyze the adjustment as well as the 
impact of credible targets on expectations. In addition, I evaluate the idiosyncratic 
determinants on the formation of expectations. The analysis reveals six results: First, I 
find evidence that long-term inflation expectations are firmly anchored to a credible 
target. Second, a temporary deviation due to unexpected monetary policy might trigger 
a decline in credibility, and third a de-anchoring of expectations due to uncertainty. 
Fourth, I find that people change their expectations little if a credible target exists. Fifth, 
expectations exhibit a large degree of time-variance only in environments without a 
target. Sixth, the dynamic adjustment to an ‘incomplete’ equilibrium, which is 
theoretically unstable, is nevertheless rapid and persistent in case of credible targets. All 
in all, I demonstrate a unique game setup with contributions to both experimental and 
monetary economics. 
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1.0   Introduction 
 
Central bankers and academics emphasize the importance of low and stable inflation rates. It is needless to say 
that the European Central Bank's (ECB) primary objective is to maintain price stability according to the article 
127(1) Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Interestingly the TFEU does not provide an 
explicit definition of price stability, however, the ECB operationalizes this statement by “A Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices for the euro area below, but close to 2% over the medium term.” With regards to maintaining 
the price stability at 2 per cent, academic literature points out the requirement of both a credible target and firmly 
anchored expectations. In other words, central banks have to anchor the expected inflation rate at the official 
inflation target. However this requires independence and, even more importantly, credibility of monetary policy. 
 
In this paper, I provide new empirical evidence on the formation and determinants of inflation expectations as 
well as the importance of target credibility. I conduct an experimental study and utilize a modified ‘beauty contest 
game’ to analyze the anchoring of expectations as well as the impact of credibility. I undertake this game 
experiment with 207 randomly selected students, staff members, and professionals from 2011 to 2012. This study 
is unique because it establishes a new empirical measurement approach for inflation expectations. Furthermore 
it is based on a novel game design that allows the analysis of the expectation process with unprecedented 
modifications. The results are of importance for monetary policy especially for central banks in particular in times 
of uncertainty. 
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The main findings are as follows: First, I have evidence that long-term inflation expectations remain well anchored 
to the definition of price-stability of below, but close to 2.0 per cent in the sample. Second, increasing uncertainty 
due to the euro area crisis, however, might trigger likely changes in inflation expectations. Even though only a few 
increases are found in short-run game expectations in general, the change of expectations is considerable if a 
higher level of uncertainty is introduced to the game setup. People lacking economic knowledge are at first 
exposed to inflation de-anchoring effects. Third, I find a measurable decline of target credibility that cannot be 
recognized in official surveys on inflation expectations during that time period. This finding is called an ‘erosion 
of credibility below the surface’. It demonstrates the potential danger of highly accommodative monetary policy. 
The erosion of credibility may continue, and gets even more severe, provided that uncertainty increases due to 
interest rates at the zero lower bound, for instance. Given this ambiguous environment, I find in the experiment 
that increasing uncertainty (created via hidden cheating in the game) impairs credibility and finally de-anchors 
the inflation expectations. Fourth, people change their views and expectations only a little if the target is credible. 
Moreover there is evidence that non-economic participants on average expect higher inflation rates and they are 
less concerned about the impact of asset purchasing programs or balance sheet extensions. Fifth, expectations 
exhibit a larger degree of time-variance in case of an arrangement without a target. Sixth, it turns out that the 
convergence process towards the ‘incomplete’ target-equilibrium is incredibly fast, if there exists a credible 
(inflation) objective. Finally, there is evidence that a higher level of education produces both, lower levels and 
volatility in inflation expectations. All in all, my paper is the first which utilizes experimental game theory for 
research in monetary economics. I show new insights on the formation and convergence of expectations in an 
environment with and without credible (inflation) targets. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review. In section 3, I describe 
the setup of the experimental game. The discussion of the results is devoted to section 4. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.0   Literature review 
 
In modern macroeconomics, particularly in monetary theory, rational expectations play an essential role. The idea 
of rational expectations imply that shocks or new information do not change the expectations at all, because 
current expectations contain all the past and future information. Thus agents' predictions are not biased or 
systematically wrong. In theory, economists use this assumption to determine the optimal inflation rate while 
central banks minimize their loss function. However, a couple of years ago, a debate has emerged regarding the 
proper modeling and understanding of (inflation) expectations in macroeconomics (Woodford, 2005; Sims, 
2009). Among other problems, I see a proper modeling of expectations as the biggest challenge in today’s sciences 
of economics. 
 
There is already rich literature available with regards to inflation expectations. Orphanides and Williams (2005) 
develop a model in which inflation expectations are sensitive to economic shocks. Consequently, the current 
financial turmoil has the potential to alter inflation perceptions. In this line, there are also microfounded 
approaches (Brazier et al., 2008; Sims, 2009). They demonstrate, by utilizing an optimization problem, that agents 
are constrained in their ability to process news. Thus agents receive noisy signals of economic shocks that bias 
expectations in the end. Brazier et al., (2008) build a model on the formation of inflation expectations based on 
two heuristics: the lagged and targeted inflation rate. They find that agents switch between both regimes in the 
assessment of price stability. Similarly there are papers by Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) or Cargill and Parker 
(2004) that follow a behavioral economic approach. Both argue that a bias or overconfidence leads to temporary 
changes in expectations. This phenomenon was econometrically observed during the currency conversion in the 
euro area in 1999 (Schwarze et al., 2010). 
 
The model by Demertzis et al. (2009) is close to the idea of my paper. According to that paper, individuals form 
their expectations based on all the available information which is noisy. Agents know that expectations depend 
on monetary policy and on the expectations of all the other agents. The relative weight assigned to these two 
factors is finally determined within the model. My game experiment enables me to experimentally study the 
formation process of expectations particularly in relation to the expectations of other agents and exogenous 
factors. The experimental game setup is a modified ‘beauty contest game’. Overall I embed this unique game 
experiment to the literature of monetary policy. 
 
A seminal paper by Nagel (1995) established an empirical literature on the implications of game theory with the 
usage of the 'beauty contest game'. She shows that the experimental results significantly deviate from the game-
theoretic reasoning. The equilibrium process is rather iterative than an elimination of dominant strategies. The 
reasoning process follows finite and not infinite steps as supposed in the theory. She simply shows that ordinary 
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people have either first or second-order beliefs. Nevertheless, over time, the numbers converge to the Nash 
equilibrium, which is due to learning-rules (Heinemann et al., 2009). These so-called guessing games have been a 
fruitful source to assess boundaries of human rationality (Heinemann et al., 2009; Nagel & Grosskopf, 1998). Given 
the results of such experiments, Camerer (2003) points out that human subjects play ‘as if’ they were considering 
no more than a few iterated steps of reasoning. I show that these games may also provide useful insights in the 
understanding of (inflation) expectations in monetary economics. Thus my paper brings forward a valuable 
approach in experimental economics to macroeconomics, and especially in monetary economics. In other words, 
I study how people build expectations subject to the expectations of others and exogenous factors. In particular, I 
elucidate the impact of target credibility on (inflation) expectations, which is vital in the literature of central 
banking. 
 
To my knowledge, this is the first paper that applies an experimental approach to inflation expectations despite 
distinct complementarities in monetary economic literature. In addition, my approach significantly differentiates 
from the existing literature. The existing approaches are either based on surveys or on measures from financial 
markets. Until today, surveys have been the only direct measurement method of inflation expectations commonly 
used by central banks (ECB, 2006). On the contrary, my approach gathers information based on an experimental 
setup. The experimental setup has the advantage of mitigating the existing deficiencies of survey research. First, 
surveys are cross-sections with low frequencies, and are only suitable to analyze long-term properties. Second, 
surveys heavily rely on the willingness of the respondents to tell the truth. Third, the wording and understanding 
of the questions are sensitive to the result and people may perceive inflation quite differently (Mankiw & Reis, 
2003). Due to these shortcomings, central banks started to analyze break-even inflation rates in financial markets 
(Swanson et al. 2007). The advantage of this measurement method is the higher frequency, especially during 
crises (Galati et al. 2011). But there are similar faults. The computation of expected inflation based on financial 
products require strong assumptions, such as the decomposition of the expected inflation rate, risk premium, 
liquidity premium, and other technical factors (Hoerdahl & Tristani, 2012). 
 
Nonetheless both measurement approaches reveal stylized facts. Mankiw & Reis, (2003) find evidence that 
experts' opinions spread slowly from person-to-person, which leads to low variability of inflation expectations 
(Carroll, 2003; Capistran & Timmermann, 2009). Furthermore a study by Clark and Davig (2008) analyze the key 
determinants of inflation expectations and find a significant reliance on macroeconomic variables. Forsells and 
Kenny (2008) find the same for the euro area, and Levin et al. (2004) illustrate that expectations are highly 
correlated with the three-year moving average of the lagged inflation. They argue in line with Clark and Nakata 
(2008) that this is due to the so-called period of ‘great moderation’. Consequently the existing literature confirms 
that firmly anchored inflation expectations do not respond to shocks or temporary crises. However, there is a 
doubt that these findings are biased due to the period of the ‘great moderation’. Thus, my experimental study 
sheds light to this concern, and studies inflation expectations in times of crises and high uncertainty. Whether the 
‘old’ stylized facts remain valid in a period of uncertainty is an up-to-date challenge. 
 
3.0   Experimental design and rationale 
 
The main source of my analysis on the formation and persistence of inflation expectations are gathered 
experimental game data, created via modifications of the beauty contest game. I carried out the experiments in 
the period of March 2011 to March 2012. The approach has the following unique features compared to the existing 
methods of measuring inflation expectations: First, the experiment allows studying of the formation and 
anchoring process of expectations in a dynamic setup (round I to round III). In addition, the idiosyncratic data of 
the questionnaire enables me to evaluate the determinants during the formation process. Second, the 
experimental design provides insight to the importance and role of credible inflation targets, which is unique to 
my knowledge. Third, I test the so-called group size effect that proposes greater strategic decision-making in 
larger groups. Fourth, I test and confirm the ‘quarter law’ of the so-called attraction factor in a quantum model of 
decision-making. Finally, I control the trustworthiness of the participants' expectations using pecuniary 
incentives. Overall the experiment evaluates the formation of expectations and demonstrates both the role and 
dynamics of credibility. Both issues are of importance for stable (inflation) expectations. But whose discovery via 
standard inflation surveys has been impossible up until today. 
 
The benchmark game is designed as a beauty contest game in literature (Kocher & Sutter, 2005). On the one hand, 
this guarantees that each participant considers the best response in terms of (inflation) expectations (winning 
number) in comparison to the expectations of all the other people. On the other hand, I modify the game in a rather 
tricky manner by introducing a predefined target of 2.0, which serves as a credible (inflation) anchor. This should 
fasten the convergence towards the target value during the round I, but would likely slow down the adjustment 
to the Nash equilibrium at zero. At best, the predefined anchor attracts the majority of expectations around the 
target value at all times. I call such a situation an ‘incomplete’ subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (Gueth et al., 
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2002). The reasoning is as follows: the target level is neither a subgame perfect equilibrium nor a Nash 
equilibrium. It is incomplete because it is inherently unstable. This peculiar ‘quasi’ equilibrium rests in the fact 
that people are attracted to credible targets. Thus the result is a persistent but temporarily deviates from the Nash 
equilibrium. Without a target, I expect a gradual convergence towards the Nash equilibrium at zero in the 
subsequent rounds. Finally, I introduce a smart re-design of the previous game experiment. Here I test the 
convergence speed of expectations and the role of credibility towards the target. This is conducted within a new 
game environment, which I call a ‘cheating game’. This is a novel idea even in experimental economics. It is 
explained in detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
The game experiment is conducted involving 207 participants and then split into two subsamples. The first 
subsample contains N = 95 individuals. This group plays the benchmark ‘beauty contest game’ with a credible 
target as explained above. The second subsample has N = 112 members. This subsample plays the modified 
benchmark game. I label it as a cheating game in respect of the supposedly credible target. Each game experiment 
is played in three different sequential sessions and lasts about 90 minutes. Whether to play the benchmark or 
cheating game is randomly assigned to the groups. Consequently the results are not biased nor affected by learning 
effects because of game sequence. Each game session consists of at least three rounds and each round lasts about 
10 minutes. In addition, at the start and at the end of every round, each participant has to answer a questionnaire. 
Here, I ask for comments on the game decision as well as the assessment of the target credibility in the respective 
game round. In addition, I ask for further socio-economic variables in the questionnaire, such as age, gender, years 
of education, economic background, work experience, and grades in school. In order to motivate participants to 
respond accurately and act as realistic as possible, I introduce pecuniary incentives – as usually done in 
experimental economics – offering money or other valuable gifts. The promised reward is assigned to the winner 
(defined by the best responses) during the overall experimental game. 
 
In each game session, approximately 10 to 25 players seat far away from each other in a classroom so that 
communication is not possible. At the beginning the instructor announces the common information and explains 
the rules of the game. In addition, I provide a written statement with the rules. Then the group plays three rounds 
of game session number one. After that they play game sessions two and three, each of which consists of three 
rounds. Session two and three are based on new information but without the knowledge of whether it is the 
standard or cheating game. The players are identified with anonymous numbers. After each round, they write 
their estimate of the expected inflation rate (or inflation guess) on response cards. I request that individuals 
choose their own inflation expectations based on their judgment about the current central bank policy, the state 
of the economy, and other people's expectations in the game experiment. Thus each participant has to solve the 
trade-off of choosing a number based on his or her assessment in the game environment. Moreover the 
participants have to give a written explanation or comment in the questionnaire. Thereafter the response cards 
and questionnaires are collected and the computation of the mean is carried out. Then the game result, which is 
defined as mean value times a given parameter, is written on the blackboard. The expectation closest to this 
number wins the round. At the end, the winner (best choices in all rounds) gets the 1st prize. All other players 
receive a consolation gift. 
 
In general, the reasoning of the beauty contest game, the benchmark setup, is straight forward. All participants 
simultaneously choose a number within the closed interval [0, 10]. It is possible to choose a number with one 
decimal place; for instance 4.2. The winner is the person whose number is closest to the mean of all the chosen 
numbers multiplied by the parameter p, where p is a predetermined positive number. In other words, p is common 
knowledge and always announced before playing the game. For 0 < p < 1, a unique Nash equilibrium exists at 
which all players choose zero (Nagel, 1995).1 In this case, game theory predicts an unambiguous outcome. But in 
reality, this happens slowly by iteration due to lower-order belief of ordinary people. In the first round, a player 
has no information about the behavior of the other players. Hereby each player has to form expectations about 
the choices of other players based on either objective evidence or subjective criteria. After the round one, all 
members reveal more but noisy information. The new information, however, is rather fuzzy due to the anonymity 
about the actual behavior of the group members. 
 
Next, as mentioned above, I make two modifications on the standard ‘beauty contest game’. The ultimate goal of 
the modifications is the creation of further fuzziness and uncertainty. As a consequence, the modified game setup 
disturbs people’s formation process of expectations. The two modifications are as follows: (A) either credible or 
incredible inflation targets within the benchmark game, or (B) a cheating game. A cheating game irritates or fools 
people's reasoning process significantly due to the announcement of wrong mean numbers after each round. Both 
modifications allow me to elucidate the following issues: how players form belief; the role of credible and 
incredible targets; and how credibility affects the formation and persistence of expectations. 
                                                          
1 In general, for p = 1 and more than two players, it is a coordination game and there are infinitely many equilibrium constellations in which 
all players must choose the same numbers (Ochs, 1995). 
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In the end, I identify whether players incorporate mental processes of the others, and study the role of credible 
targets in their (conscious) reasoning. The rationale behind the modified beauty contest game is as follows: First, 
I use the property of the credible inflation target of 2.0 (enforced by a central bank) and ask the participants what 
they would choose and what their inflation expectation would be in this game context. Consequently all 
participants face a trade-off of choosing between the credible target of 2.0 times the p parameter, i.e. 2*p, or 
winning the game by reasoning with higher-order belief (2*p2 or 2*p3...), i.e. still choosing the Nash equilibrium 
at zero. A credible anchoring and/or persistence of expectations can be confirmed, if an outcome of about 2*p 
results in the first and subsequent rounds in average. However, if I find a convergence to zero, similar to the 
benchmark setup, I would reject the hypothesis of a firm inflation anchor. This would imply that winning the game 
predominates, and thus the inflation target is incredible or the game incentives are too weak. Consequently I have 
to check the level of game incentives by playing the cheating game. 
 
Suppose the game instructor always announces a wrong mean after each round, which is different to the ‘true 
mean’ played by the participants. Obviously this cheating induces an artificial incentive to play (equilibrium) 
numbers close to the target, even if the real numbers of the group members are far away. Thus there are two 
questions of interest: a) whether people would detect this cheating, and b) how long people would stick to the 
wrong numbers.  
 
For instance, if people stick to the (inflation) target of 2.0 but, by doing so, persistently deviate from the winning 
cheating game target, I can explain this (sticky) behavior as an ‘erosion of credibility below the surface’. Therefore, 
with this innovative modification, I disentangle the agent's motive and its impact on the formation process of 
expectations. This setup is a ‘cheating game’ because the game-instructor is systematically fooling the participants. 
Consequently the players have to deal with a threefold trade-off: a winning number close to the ‘wrongly’ 
announced equilibrium or following the ‘incomplete’ target equilibrium of 2.0 or playing the Nash equilibrium at 
zero. 
 
It is noteworthy that the modification with a ‘cheating game’ is even more far-reaching in terms of the analysis of 
the persistence of expectations. The systematic agitation of the participants away from the ‘true’ target allows 
unique measurement of the persistence of inflation expectations over time. I expect a higher variance of results in 
the cheating game due to the higher level of uncertainty and fuzziness about expectation errors. The instructor 
communicates the results always with the statement that it is computed by him in full independence and under 
full transparency, such as by an independent agency or central bank. In other words, the instructor should be seen 
unbiased and independent. Without knowing that the instructor cheats, the participants have to form their 
expectations based on the announced numbers. Again this unique setup allows testing the idea of credibility and 
persistence of expectations over time. Overall both game modifications provide valuable insights about the 
formation process of (inflation) expectations. 
 
In all samples, I set p = 0.5 in order to force people to solve the respective trade-off. Theoretically, with credible 
targets, I expect that the individuals rapidly converge to the equilibrium number of 1.0, which is in-line with the 
target of 2.0 (times the p-parameter of 0.5). Moreover I expect certain persistence around the target because this 
is a kind of focal point or behavioral anchor at least in the first round. Given people play truthfully, the game should 
illustrate a fast and persistent convergence towards 1.0 in the target game. Of course, credibility of the target is a 
prerequisite for both the convergence and persistence at 1.0. This issue remains to be studied in more detail in 
the cheating game setup. The cheating game forces the agents unambiguously away from the equilibrium or target 
of either zero or 1.0. 
 
4.0   Results and discussion 
 
I organize the findings as follows: First, I start with an overview of the average numbers and explain the bottom-
line of the results. Thereafter I evaluate the specific features of every round: for instance, the adjustment speed 
from round to round, the credibility values in case of the cheating game, the adjustment speed of credibility, and 
the self-assessment of current and past inflation rates. In the second subsection, I study the econometric findings 
in regard to the idiosyncratic and socio-economic variables in relation to the revealed ‘real’ and ‘experimental’ 
(inflation) expectations. The final subsection is devoted to an empirical test of the quarter law assumed in a 
quantum model of decision-making (Herzog, 2015). 
 
4.01   Results of the game experiment 
 
Figure (1) summarizes the main findings of the experimental game regarding the formation of expectations and 
the role of target credibility. The Figure depicts the inflation expectations from round I to round III. The red line 
reflects the average inflation guessed by all the participants in the game without an inflation target. In the first 
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round, the value is close to 3.0, followed by a continuous decline to 1.4 in round III. The winning number in round 
III is close to 0.7, i.e. 1.4 times p = 0.5. Overall my experimental finding is in line with the literature of beauty 
contest games. There is a gradual convergence towards the Nash equilibrium at zero. 
 
The solid blue line depicts the mean guesses of participants, however, in a game with an explicit and credible 
target of 2.0. Firstly and strikingly, there is a fast convergence towards 2.0 already in the first round. The average 
in round I equals 2.1. This demonstrates that participants expect the others’ expectations to be close to the 
credible target. Thus a target stabilizes and anchors the expectations at the target level, even if the winning game 
number is lower. In the next two rounds, the average numbers remain almost constant. In round II, the average is 
1.6 and surprisingly rebound to 2.0 in round III. Consequently the game results of round I and round III are 
significant at 1 per cent and they do not show any statistical difference to the target value of 2.0. 
 
This confirms the hypothesis that a credible (inflation) target attracts people at least in the first place. Moreover 
it confirms a fast and almost persistent convergence around the target level over time. This is partly surprising 
based on the standard utility theory because the majority of people who choose a number at the credible target 
will definitely lose the game and thereby achieve lower economic utility. However the new idea of a quantum 
model of decision-making provides a reasonable explanation to this behavior: people are more attracted to the 
credible target, and thus the so-called attraction factor outweighs the utility factor (Herzog, 2015). People choose 
the target level despite losing utility in the game; overall they are better off.  
 
It is remarkable that this pattern is almost always observable in all game experiments. The persistent deviation 
from the winning Nash equilibrium cannot be explained by the standard utility theory. Of course, the majorities 
of people have lower-order belief and they are more attracted to credible targets. There are only a few selfish 
agents who (always) choose to deviate in order to win the game. 
 
Figure 01: Average expectation and average credibility per round 
 
 
 
 
 
The bars in Figure (1) depict the main result of the cheating game; it reflects the participants' judgment of target 
credibility. The numbers range between ten, for very high credibility, and zero, for no credibility at all. Despite 
cheating in round I, most people trust the computed mean value. The average trust value is 5.4 out of 10 in round 
I (right-hand scale). The credibility remains almost constant in round II. There is only a small decline to 4.9 out of 
10. However, surprisingly to me, this target credibility significantly erodes in round III. The credibility drops to 
3.3 out of 10. This change is even significant at 1 per cent. It can be said that people are concerned about the target 
if they experience a mysterious disturbance after two subsequent rounds. The majority of agents still choose 
(inflation) expectations close to 2.0 in round III, even though they lost confidence in the target. This illustrates an 
ongoing erosion of credibility below the surface. Consequently, this erosion process starts long before the 
occurrence of any measurable change in (inflation) expectations.  
 
I believe this finding shows how sensible inflation expectations are and how carefully central banks should 
monitor any change. I find that the erosion of credibility results in a partial de-anchoring of expectations. The 
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standard deviation of the responses in round III is also significantly higher than in round I and II. Apart from the 
standard deviation of expectations, the standard deviation of credibility is continuously increasing (Table 1). Both 
effects are neither measured nor detected in any standard inflation survey methodology. 
 
In addition, I find evidence that expectations, especially after a reassessment in the cheating game, spread slowly 
to those of other people, and display a low variability at the beginning. Both issues can be seen in Table (1). First 
the standard deviations in round I and II are 1.23 and 1.54 respectively, which are significantly lower than the one 
in the standard game, i.e. 5 per cent. The high kurtosis in the target game demonstrates the slow spread of 
expectations from people to people. These findings are similar to Swanson et al. (2007), Carroll, (2003) or  
Capistran & Timmermann, 2009. However, in contrast to literature, the variability significantly increases as soon 
as the erosion below the surface starts in the cheating game setup. In round III in particular, the standard deviation 
is 2.56, well above 1.83 in the benchmark game. These findings demonstrate that unanticipated events, shocks, or 
highly accommodative monetary policy may early increase uncertainty and create adverse undetected effects on 
expectations and the overall economy. 
 
Even more astonishing is the fact that the majority of 207 participants expect ‘real’ inflation well above 2.0. In fact, 
my survey data reveal that the majority of people assesses – independently from the game – inflation expectation 
at 3.3 in five years with a standard deviation of 1.5. This is anecdotal evidence that people reveal rather short- to 
medium-run inflation expectations within the game setup; this was also noted by comments in the questionnaire. 
Nonetheless this observation strengthens the findings in the cheating game, because it makes the observed 
erosion below the surface even more dangerous in the long-run. Consequently my experimental game reveals vital 
short-run preferences. Of course, this result is in contrast to central bank surveys at that time (Galati & Poelhekke, 
2011). Most surveys find firmly anchored expected inflation rates. My study, however, reveals the hidden effects 
in times of uncertainty which is undetected by standard surveys in central banking today. 
 
Next, I proceed with a comparative look at the experimental results (Table 1). I distinguish between the two 
subsamples – with and without inflation targets. The ‘real’ inflation expectations of the members in both 
subsamples are almost the same. The average past and expected inflation rates are 2.1 and 2.9 respectively – and 
the same in both subsamples. The estimate of current inflation is, on average, 2.5 (and 2.4) and thus again 
significantly closes in both subsamples. The preferred inflation target of all the participants in the sample is close 
to 2.0. The cheating game demonstrates that a systematic cheating more likely impairs the credibility of the 
inflation anchor than the level of inflation expectations (Table 1 and Figure 1). Although I find a destabilization, 
measured by the loss of target credibility in round III, this finding does not imply a rapid de-anchoring of ‘real’ 
expectations. As already discussed, game expectations are rather short-run, and thus differ to ‘real’ inflation 
expectations. 
 
Figure (2) illustrates the convergence process of expectations in both subsamples. The top (bottom) panel of 
Figure (2) depicts the convergence process without (with) a target. Furthermore the graphs on the left-hand side 
display the convergence process from round I to round II; and on the right-hand side from round II to round III 
respectively. Strikingly the bottom figure depicts fast convergence to the ‘quasi’ equilibrium. This process is faster 
than the convergence to the Nash equilibrium at zero in the top panel. The reason for this quick convergence is 
probably based on the explicit announcement of the credible target. Consequently participants immediately use 
the target as an anchor in round I. Of course, the anchoring effect only works if the majority believes that the target 
is credible. Henceforth, if almost everybody reasons in the same way and anticipates the target to be credible, the 
so-called anchoring effect appears. This anchoring effect is well-known in behavioral economics.  
 
Furthermore, in case of a credible target, I find a cluster of expectations around the target level times the p 
parameter even in round III. There is no bijective convergence towards zero – the Nash equilibrium in the game 
setup. Generally this demonstrates the effectiveness of a credible target. However fooling the people and thereby 
losing credibility, as I show in the cheating game, suspends the effectiveness of a credible target with some time 
delay. Therefore it can be said that it is just a matter of time until the de-anchoring of expectations gets out of 
hand. Despite the explanation that a target gives an orientation in round I, I am surprised to see the effectiveness 
and persistence in all subsequent rounds. The anchoring at the target level seems to serve as a dominant strategy. 
A second objective of this experimental study is to enhance the understanding of the formation process of 
expectations. Therefore I compare my findings to real-world expectations by asking all the participants about their 
economic knowledge, the understanding of the ECB, and so on. I find evidence that most people in the sample 
know the current inflation target and define the target between 1.5 and 2.0. Nonetheless, there is a substantial 
number of participants (65 out of 207) who believe that the inflation target is between 0.0 and 1.0. The latter 
belief is prevalent under participants without economic knowledge. In contrast, participants with some economic 
background are more familiar with the inflation target and the functioning of central banks. However an 
unexpected result appears if you ask the participants what inflation target they would prefer. An overwhelming 
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majority prefers a target of 2.0. This is astonishing because it is inconsistent with at least 65 peoples' responses 
who define the inflation target between 0.0 and 1.0. 
 
 
 
The results above can be even strengthened by calculating the adjustment speed in both samples from round I to 
round III. I find that participants in the game without a target have – in terms of adjustment speed – high numbers. 
In case of a credible target, the adjustment is almost zero in all categories. This finding implies that people 
immediately use the credible target as an anchor in round I and thereafter stick to it in all subsequent rounds. 
Consequently there is nearly no shift or reassessment of the initial expectations. Again this confirms the anchoring 
and persistence of expectations in case of credible targets. 
 
Finally I focus on the credibility issue in more detail. The right-hand panel in Table (1) shows the subjective 
assessment of credibility. The majority of the test persons judge the credibility at a mean of 5.4 in round I. The 
credibility assessment in round II is of 4.9. In round III, subjects start doubting the credibility and either suspect 
it to be incorrectly informed or become indifferent to the target. Consequently the average credibility drop to 3.3, 
which is significantly different from round I at 1 per cent. The standard deviation increases from 2.5 in round I 
and II to 2.8 in round III. I already labeled this case the erosion below the surface. 
 
 
Table 01: Summary of Results 
Game 
Design 
Intervals Expectations(choices)a) Target Credibility Assessment 
Round I Round II Round III Round I Round II Round III 
With  
target 
N=12 
(Cheating) 
0.0-0.5 4 15 2 2 1 11 
0.5-1.0 19 35 46 4 4 17 
1.0-1.5 18 24 32 0 0 0 
1.5-2.0 32 22 16 6 5 12 
2.0-2.5 15 7 2 0 0 0 
 2.5-3.0 7 3 2 9 11 16 
 3.0-3.5 4 0 1 1 0 0 
 3.5-4.0 7 2 1 13 7 4 
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 4.0-4.5 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 4.5-5.0 0 0 0 8 12 15 
 5.0-5.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 5.5-6.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 6.0-6.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 6.5-7.0 0 0 0 17 7 7 
 7.0-7.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 7.5-8.0 1 1 0 17 9 5 
 8.0-8.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 8.5-9.0 0 0 0 4 2 0 
 9.0-9.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 9.5-10.0 0 2 10 7 6 6 
Weigh Average 1.87*** 1.46 1.94*** 5.44 4.98 3.35 
Median 3.88 2.88 2.13 4.00 3.88 4.12 
Std. Dev.b) 1.23 1.54 2.56 2.56 2.57 2.80 
Kurtosis 6.82 6.80 12.76 0.93 -1.03 0.20 
N 110 111 112 88 64 93 
Without 
target 
N=12 
 
0.0-0.5 2 12 26  
0.5-1.0 3 24 26 
1.0-1.5 6 22 16 
1.5-2.0 16 13 10 
2.0-2.5 12 4 5 
2.5-3.0 21 9 6 
3.0-3.5 10 1 0 
3.5-4.0 7 0 1 
4.0-4.5 5 3 0 
4.5-5.0 4 0 0 
 5.0-5.5 1 2 0 
 5.5-6.0 0 0 0 
 6.0-6.5 0 0 0 
 6.5-7.0 2 1 0 
 7.0-7.5 1 0 0 
 7.5-8.0 1 0 1 
 8.0-8.5 0 0 0 
 8.5-9.0 0 0 1 
 9.0-9.5 0 0 0 
 9.5-10.0 1 3 2 
Weigh Average 2.88 1.78*** 1.39 a) Numbers represent the number of 
responses in the respective intervals, b) 
Standard deviation is calculated on the 
basis of the respective game 
expectations. 
Source: own. 
Median 3.88 3.13 3.00 
Std. Dev.b) 1.63 1.90 1.83 
Kurtosis 2.94 3.99 5.33 
N 92 94 94 
T-test with Ho=2.0 vs. H1, Reading. ***=significant at 1%, **=significant at 5%, *=significant at 10%, 
 
4.03  Evaluation of socio-economic data: Econometric study 
 
The analysis of socio-economic data reveals the determinants of the formation process of expectations. The 
regression equation contains the following socio-economic variables: age, skill, grade, year of education, year of 
professional experience, credibility assessment in each round, and current and past individual’s inflation 
expectations. In addition, I control gender, academic major, and some other features. 
 
First, let me discuss the regression results of round I. Not surprisingly the regressions in round II and round III 
are insignificant. At the first view, this looks astonishing, but the game setting convincingly explains this issue. 
People have to form expectations independently only in round I. Thus, in round I, they utilize all idiosyncratic and 
socio-economic experience. The personal characteristics indeed affect the judgment in the first round. On the 
contrary, in round II and round III, people already obtain (game) information about the average numbers from 
the previous rounds and group members. Of course, that information is valuable, and influences the judgment of 
the people in the subsequent rounds. Accordingly the individual characteristics, such as grades or years of 
education, matter less in subsequent rounds. Moreover this finding proves the fact that people follow a learning-
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rule (Heinemann et al., 2009). In summary, this explains the robustness and significance of the regression model 
in round I (Table 2). 
 
In addition, it turns out that the ‘real’ expected inflation rate in five years is significant and positively related to 
the game expectations in round I. Therefore individuals with higher ‘real-world’ expectations choose higher 
numbers in the beauty contest game. This finding demonstrates that people use their ‘real’ expectations as an 
anchor in round I – if there is no other anchor available. However, as supposed by the game theories, the smarter 
the participant, the faster their convergence towards the equilibrium, and thus they tend to choose lower 
numbers. This is reflected in the positive sign of the ‘School-grades’ variable of 1.207. This variable is significant 
even at 1 per cent. Interestingly work experience is not significant. This result may be explained by the fact that 
the sample is dominated by students and other academics with low or no professional experience. It turns out 
that, in a subsample excluding students, the variable is almost significant at 10 per cent. Conversely age and past 
inflation are significant at 10 per cent. Both variables are negatively related to the expectations, i.e. the older the 
person and the higher the perceived past inflation, the lower the numbers they choose in round I. This is expected 
because older people are more exposed to inflation risks. Therefore they are usually more risk averse. Finally I 
find that women select lower numbers (expectation levels) than men. This might indicate that women are smarter 
or more risk-averse. The answer to this question is left to further research. 
 
Table 02: Regression models 
 Model 1 
Dep. Round I 
Model 2 
Dep. Real exp. Inflation 
Constant 2.968 7.618*** 
 (1.97) (1.76) 
Real expected 0.736***  
Inflation (0.09)  
Gender -1.194*  
 (0.40)  
School Gate 1.207***  
 (0.34)  
Work 0.015  
Experience (0.01)  
Age -0.142* -0.108 
 (0.07) (0.05) 
Past -0.334* -0.306 
Inflation (0.17) (0.24) 
Credibility -0.345*** -0.385*** 
Assessment (0.09) (0.09) 
Target Change  0.556* 
  (0.32) 
R squared 0.693 0.477 
Adj. R squared 0.645 0.377 
F- statistic 14.67 4.792 
Prob. (F- statistic) 0.000 0.006 
N 207 207 
Std. error in parenthesis. And notion: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
Furthermore I estimate the determinants of ‘real’ expected inflation in five years as a dependent variable (second 
column). As expected, I find that the older the people and the higher the perceived inflation, the lower the 
(preferred) expectations. This finding is in line with literature by Clark and Davig (2008), who find that the 
determinants of inflation expectations are macroeconomic variables and past inflation. Moreover Levin et al. 
(2004) illustrate that expectations are correlated with a moving average of the lagged inflation rate. However I 
cannot find evidence for the hypothesis that work experience and education stabilize expectations. Work-
experience is always insignificant and therefore excluded from the model. This exclusion has no effect on the signs 
or significance of the other variables. The variable ‘Credibility Assessment’ reflects the participants' assessment 
of the credibility of the inflation target. I find that a high target credibility by the game participants imply lower 
inflation expectations. Of course, this relationship is as expected. In addition, it is in-line with my game result 
above. In the end, this finding echoes the erosion of credibility below the surface. In summary, the regression 
highlights the importance of target credibility for the anchoring of (inflation) expectations. Therefore it can be 
said that a firm anchoring of expectations is tough without target credibility. In the short-run, I need the credibility 
for a fast and persistent convergence. In the long-run, credibility is crucial to keep the expectations close to the 
target despite random disturbances or temporary policy deviations. 
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Next, I distinguish between the response of people with and without economic knowledge. I have participants in 
the sample among other scientific backgrounds, such as chemistry, engineering, design, art, and computer science. 
Overall, I find a decline in target credibility among people in this group. This might be triggered by the lack of 
economic knowledge combined with the uncertainty linked to the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis. The 
last point was noted by several people. Non-economic students are more concerned about the overall 
development of the economy, and less on the details of new monetary programs. This corresponds to findings in 
other scientific studies that confirm the importance of overall macroeconomic variables for inflation expectations 
(Clark & Davig, 2008). In my sample, people with non-economic majors reveal both higher ‘real’ and 
‘experimental’ expectations than people with economic background. Interestingly economic students are virtually 
more concerned about the asset purchasing programs and the size of central banks’ balance sheet in respect to 
the inflation expectations than the overall economy. This is in contrast to a study by Clark and Nakata (2008) who 
find that the period of ‘great moderation’ and the introduction of inflation targeting have inherently anchored 
expectations at low levels permanently. 
 
Lastly I find that people who prefer higher inflation (proposal by Blanchard et al. 2010), also reveal higher ‘real’ 
and ‘experimental’ inflation expectations. This result is measured by the variable ‘Target Change’. People in this 
group display a higher time-variance in expectations, despite a credible target. In average, the variance is of 106 
per cent above the reference group. Furthermore the variance increases with the number of rounds. Once again, 
this indicates the importance of credible targets in central banking. 
 
4.04   Further empirical results 
 
The final subsection is devoted to the verification of the so-called quarter-law in a quantum model of decision-
making (QMDM) (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953; Yukalov & Sornette, 2011; Herzog, 2015). The QMDM is a 
new alternative to existing behavioral economic models due to several decision-making paradoxes (Ellsberg, 
1961; Kahneman & Tversky, 1976; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Chew et al. 1991; Ariely, 2008). First of all, I evaluate 
the so-called group size effect. This means that groups process information more effectively than individuals. Thus 
groups act more strategically. In fact, I find that larger groups (sample) converge faster to the equilibrium. In 
addition, this finding confirms the error-attenuation hypothesis that decision-errors decline with increasing 
information and group size. In case of the first subsample (N=95), the relevant average numbers are 3.0 in round 
I; 1.8 in round II; and 1.4 in round III respectively. The same numbers for the full sample (N=207) are 2.6 in round 
I; 1.8 in round II; and 1.1 in round III respectively. This is first evidence for a faster convergence to zero for the 
larger sample. To my knowledge, this paper provides first empirical evidence to this phenomenon, which has been 
only a theoretical proposition up until today. 
 
Furthermore I evaluate the quarter law, which is a property of the attraction factor in the QMDM. First I calculate 
the utility factor. Thereafter I calculate the attraction factor based on the game data. I use these values, as supposed 
in the model, to compute the mean-value of the attraction factor. Throughout the experimental data, I find 
evidence almost in-line with the quarter law (Table 3). But due to the small sample of just N = 207, this is not a 
rigorous verification. Therefore this topic leaves room for further research. 
 
Table 3: Calculated means of attraction factor (= Quarter Law) 
 Round I Round II Round III 
Attraction Factor 0.264 0.295 0.268 
 
Nevertheless there is evidence that the mean-value of the attraction factor is close to a quarter. Despite the fact 
that the law of large numbers is not fully applicable, I think the quantum model provides valuable insights to 
decision-making processes of both individuals and groups under high uncertainty. 
 
5.0   Conclusion 
 
Since the onset of the financial crisis, there has been a lively debate about the role of (rational) expectations in 
macroeconomic models and whether a change in the inflation target may help foster the recovery process. Both 
issues are closely related to my study. I experimentally analyze how agents form expectations, and demonstrate 
the role of credible (inflation) targets. Interest rates at the zero-lower bound and highly accommodative monetary 
policy in all major industrialized countries may create doubts and uncertainty on price-stability. The 
announcement of quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and the 
European Central Bank in 2015 demonstrates the abnormal situation. The economic implication of the current 
strategy in monetary economics is unknown even among economists. Yet recognizing the early warning signs 
requires a better understanding of the formation of (inflation) expectations. This paper sheds new light on this 
issue and identifies vulnerabilities and triggers. 
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This paper contributes to the literature with several distinguishing features: First, I have evidence that 
expectations remain well anchored as long as the target is credible. Second, cheating and uncertainty influence 
expectations rather little at the beginning but likely further after some time. This gradual erosion below the 
surface cannot be measured and recognized by the current survey techniques. Third, participants change their 
expectations rather little if they face a credible target and have economic knowledge. Fourth, expectations exhibit 
a high degree of time-variance in case of no target or an incredible one. 
 
In line with Nagel (1995), I restate that people form second or third-order believe and remain well below the 
theoretical prediction of game theory. The fifth result, however, shows that convergence and persistence towards 
an ‘incomplete’ equilibrium is incredibly fast if there is a credible target. This establishes an almost stable 
anchoring effect in the human believe system. Finally I confirm that a ‘target’ change may affect the process of 
decision-making twofold: on the one hand, it increases the convergence towards the new target level, but on the 
other hand it increases the variance of expectations. The last finding impairs the credibility of the target. 
Consequently a credible target makes policy implementation more effective and enhances the internalization of 
future costs. However transparency cannot fully compensate the loss of confidence if the (inflation) target 
temporarily changes. 
 
All in all, this paper shows novel insights on the formation process of expectations under uncertainty. Due to the 
gradual erosion below the surface in my cheating game, I would be very cautious with ideas, such as the one by 
Blanchard et al. (2010), which temporarily proposes a higher inflation target of 4 or 6 per cent. This will certainly 
increase uncertainty, and thus impair central banks’ credibility. Both uncertainty and lower credibility trigger a 
de-anchoring of (inflation) expectations. Even if smart economists understand the optimality argument of 
Blanchard's proposal, it is a risky business and probably opens the Pandora's Box in the overall society. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 04: Sample with target +Table 05: Sample without target 
Game 
Design 
Intervals Block A Block B Block C 
Current 
Inflation 
Past 
Inflation 
Real expected 
Inflation (5 y.) 
ECB 
Target 
Preferred 
Target 
Adj. Speeda) 
Round I to 
Round III 
With  
target 
N=112 
0.0-0.5 0 0 0 19 3 -0.5 
0.5-1.0 1 3 0 11 0 1.4 
1.0-1.5 3 6 3 5 1 0.7 
1.5-2.0 6 1 20 17 27 -0.5 
2.0-2.5 9 7 10 5 4 -0.9 
 2.5-3.0 19 6 39 4 4 -0.7 
 3.0-3.5 3 2 7 0 1 -0.8 
 3.5-4.0 3 1 6 2 2 -0.9 
 4.0-4.5 0 0 1 0 0 -1.0 
 4.5-5.0 1 1 16 0 0 0.0 
 5.0-5.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 5.5-6.0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 6.0-6.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 6.5-7.0 0 0 1 0 0 0.0 
 7.0-7.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 7.5-8.0 0 0 1 0 0 -1.0 
 8.0-8.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 8.5-9.0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 9.0-9.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 9.5-10.0 0 0 0 1 0 0.0 
Weigh Average 2.52 2.18 2.97 1.38 1.90  
Median 2.88 2.13 3.13 3.00 2.13 
Std. Dev. 4.02 3.16 7.07 4.57 4.84 
Kurtosis 3.63 -1.07 12.62 2.36 12.74 
N 45 27 104 64 42 
Without  
target 
N=94 
 
0.0-0.5 0 0 1 23 3 11.7 
0.5-1.0 1 3 0 12 5 7.5 
1.0-1.5 5 6 4 7 1 1.6 
1.5-2.0 8 1 11 31 14 -0.4 
2.0-2.5 11 7 12 3 1 -0.6 
2.5-3.0 16 6 27 5 6 -0.7 
3.0-3.5 4 2 7 0 0 -1.0 
3.5-4.0 2 1 7 2 4 -0.9 
4.0-4.5 0 0 1 0 2 -1.0 
4.5-5.0 2 1 9 0 2 -1.0 
 5.0-5.5 0 0 0 0 0 -1.0 
 5.5-6.0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 6.0-6.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 6.5-7.0 0 0 0 0 0 -1.0 
 7.0-7.5 0 0 0 0 0 -1.0 
 7.5-8.0 0 0 1 0 0 0.0 
 8.0-8.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 8.5-9.0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 9.0-9.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 9.5-10.0 0 0 1 1 0 0.9 
Weigh Average 2.44 2.18 2.95  
Median 2.50 3.13 3.50 
Std. Dev. 3.88 3.16 5.10 
Kurtosis 0.82 -1.07 8.01 
N 49 27 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Anchoring of expectations …                                                                                                                     Herzog, JEFS (2015), 03(06), 01-15 
 
Journal of Economic and Financial Studies. 
 
Page 15 
Page 15 
 
Table 6: Full sample without target, N= 207 
Game 
Design 
Intervals Expectations(choices)a) 
Round I Round II Round III 
With  
target 
N=207 
(Cheating) 
0.0-0.5 5 22 27 
0.5-1.0 17 55 60 
1.0-1.5 19 41 43 
1.5-2.0 48 32 24 
2.0-2.5 25 9 7 
 2.5-3.0 26 11 8 
 3.0-3.5 11 1 1 
 3.5-4.0 13 2 2 
 4.0-4.5 7 3 0 
 4.5-5.0 4 0 0 
 5.0-5.5 1 2 0 
 5.5-6.0 0 0 0 
 6.0-6.5 0 0 0 
 6.5-7.0 2 1 0 
 7.0-7.5 1 0 0 
 7.5-8.0 2 1 1 
 8.0-8.5 0 0 0 
 8.5-9.0 0 0 1 
 9.0-9.5 0 0 0 
 9.5-10.0 1 5 12 
Weigh Average 2.38 1.63 1.77 
Median 4.50 3.50 3.50 
Std. Dev.b) 1.50 1.72 2.28 
Kurtosis 9.52 9.07 10.67 
N 182 185 186 
a) Numbers represent the number of responses in the respective intervals, b) 
Standard deviation is calculated on the basis of the respective game 
expectations. 
 
 
 
 
